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The core of a game is the set of its undominated outcomes, with respect to
a suitably de￿ned dominance relation, or digraph. Now, consider the ongoing
operation of an interaction system, e.g. an organization or indeed any suitably
complex decision-making unit. Let us then assume that the set of available op-
tions does in fact change at a faster pace than the behavioural attitudes of the
relevant players and the latter interact as predicted by the core. It follows that
the corresponding choice behaviour of the given interaction system as recorded
by its choice function should be constrained in some way by its game-theoretic
structure and thus somehow reveal it. But then, what are the characteristic
￿ ￿ngerprints￿of such a choice function, namely the testable behavioural predic-
tions of the core as a solution concept? Or more simply, which choice functions
may be regarded as revealed cores? Let us call that issue, for ease of reference,
the core revelation problem.
Apparently, such a problem has never been addressed in its full generality
in the extant literature. To be sure, parts of the massive body of literature
on ￿ revealed preference￿provide partial answers covering the case of nonempty
cores, i.e. of acyclic revealed dominance digraphs (see e.g. Wilson (1970), Sen
(1971), Suzumura (1983), Moulin (1985), Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) among
many others). But of course the core of a game may be empty, and its revealed
dominance digraph may have cycles. Here, we are interested precisely in the
general version of the core revelation problem, namely in a characterization
of all revealed cores as solutions for a certain ￿ universal￿outcome set and its
subsets, including (locally) empty-valued cores.
The present paper is aimed at ￿lling this gap in the literature by addressing
the general core revelation problem as formulated above, under several variants
of the notion of core. A study of the basic order-theoretic properties of the
corresponding classes of revealed core-solutions is also provided.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 includes a presentation of the
model and the main characterization results; section 3 provides some basic re-
sults concerning the order-theoretic properties of the classes of revealed core-
solutions previously characterized; section 4 consists of a few concluding re-
marks.
2 Choice functions and revealed cores
Let X be a set denoting the ￿ universal￿outcome set, with cardinality #X ￿ 3,
and P(X) its power set. It is also assumed for the sake of convenience that
X is ￿nite (but it should be remarked that the bulk of the ensuing analysis is
easily lifted with suitable minor adaptations to the case of an in￿nite outcome
set). A choice function on X is a de￿ationary operator on P(X) i.e. a function
c : P(X) ! P(X) such that c(A) ￿ A for any A ￿ X (empty choice sets
are allowed). A choice function c is proper if c(A) 6= ? whenever ? 6= A ￿ X.
We denote CX the set of all choice functions on X, and C￿
X the subset of
1all proper choice functions on X. The proper subdomain of c 2 CX -written
Dc- is the set of all subsets of X with a nonempty-valued choice set i.e. Dc =
fA ￿ X : c(A) 6= ?g. Notice that any c 2 CX fully determines its dual choice or
rejection function c by the rule: for any A ￿ X, c(A) = Anc(A); clearly, c 2 CX
as well, and c = (c). For any binary relation B ￿ X ￿ X, and any Y ￿ X, Ba
and Bs denote the asymmetric and symmetric components of B, respectively,
while BY = B \ (Y ￿ Y ) and B = (X ￿ X) n B: Recall that B ￿ X ￿ X is
re￿exive i⁄xBx for all x 2 X, irre￿exive i⁄not xBx for all x 2 X, total i⁄xBy
or yBx for any x;y 2 X, asymmetric i⁄ xBy entails not yBx for any x;y 2 X,
transitive i⁄ xBy and yBz entail xBz for any x;y;z 2 X, quasi-transitive if
Ba is transitive, negatively transitive if B is transitive. Moreover, B is a strict
partial order i⁄ it is both asymmetric and transitive.
Let ￿ ￿ X ￿ X be an irre￿exive binary relation on X, denoting a suitably
de￿ned dominance relation: (X;￿) is the corresponding dominance digraph (in
graph-theoretic parlance, (X;￿) is in particular a simple, loopless digraph i.e.
a directed graph with at most one arc between any ordered pair of vertices, and
with no arc from any vertex to itself). In particular, (X;￿) is an asymmetric
dominance digraph if ￿ = ￿a.
For any Y ￿ X, ￿Y = ￿\(Y ￿Y ) denotes the dominance relation induced by
￿ on Y (of course ￿X = ￿), and (Y;￿Y ) is the induced dominance subdigraph
on Y . Broadly speaking, the core of (Y;￿Y ) is the set of ￿Y -undominated
outcomes in Y , namely
C(Y;￿Y ) = fy 2 Y : not z￿Y y for all z 2 Y g.
The a-core of (Y;￿Y ) is the set of ￿a
Y -undominated outcomes in Y , namely
Ca(Y;￿Y ) = C(Y;￿a
Y ) = fy 2 Y : not z(￿Y )ay for all z 2 Y g.
The core (a-core) of (Y;￿Y ) is externally stable i⁄ for any z 2 Y nC(Y;￿Y )
there exists y 2 C(Y;￿Y ) such that y￿Y z (for any z 2 Y n Ca(Y;￿Y ) there
exists y 2 Ca(Y;￿Y ) such that y(￿Y )az, respectively).
A dominance digraph (X;￿) is also said to be core-perfect or strictly acyclic
(acyclic, respectively) if C(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? (Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ?, respectively) for any
Y ￿ X.
Remark 1 It should be emphasized here that any dominance digraph may arise
in a natural way from an underlying game in coalitional form. Moreover, any
asymmetric dominance digraph may arise in a natural way from a game in
coalitional form and from a related game in strategic form (see Vannucci (2009)
for further details).
The (asymmetric) basic revealed dominance digraph (X;￿(c)) of a choice
function c 2 CX is de￿ned by the following rule: for any x;y 2 X, x￿(c)y if
and only if x 6= y and c(fx;yg) = fxg. Clearly enough, ￿(c) is asymmetric
hence in particular irre￿exive by de￿nition. Two further binary relations R(c),
Rc induced by c on X and de￿ned as follows will also be considered below: for
any x;y 2 X, xRcy if and only if x 2 c(fx;yg), while xR(c)y if and only if there
exists Y ￿ X such that x 2 c(Y ) and y 2 Y .
2A choice function c 2 CX is a revealed core-solution if there exists an ir-
re￿exive relation ￿ ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) for any Y ￿ X.
Similarly, c 2 CX is a revealed a-core-solution (ES core-solution, ES a-core-
solution, respectively) if there exists an irre￿exive relation ￿ ￿ X￿X such that
c(Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) (c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) with C(Y;￿Y ) externally stable, c(Y ) =
Cu(Y;￿Y ), c(Y ) = Ca
u(Y;￿Y ), respectively) for any Y ￿ X. Then, we also say
that c is core-rationalizable (a-core-rationalizable, ES-core-rationalizable, ES-a-
core-rationalizable respectively) by the dominance digraph (X;￿). Notice that
ES (a-)core-solutions are re￿nements of (a-)core solutions. Revealed cores will
also be used as a generic label to denote the foregoing choice functions.
Example 2 Notice that the digraph (X;?) is also a dominance digraph, and
C(A;?A) = Ca(A;?A) = A for any A ￿ X (hence is trivially externally stable).
Therefore, the identity operator cid : P(X) ! P(X) is a revealed core-solution
( a-core-solution, ES core-solution,).
Example 3 By way of contrast, take ? ￿ G ￿ X and consider the dichotomic
choice function cG
￿ : P(X) ! P(X) as de￿ned by the ￿ strict￿ satis￿cing rule
cG
￿(A) = A \ G for any A ￿ X. It is easily checked that cG
￿ is not a revealed
core: to see this, take any x 2 X n G. Then, cG
￿(fxg) = ? while for any
dominance digraph (X;￿) and any x 2 X, it cannot be the case that x￿x hence
C(fxg;￿fxg) = Ca(fxg;￿fxg) = fxg (which is also trivially externally stable).
Example 4 Next, take again ? ￿ G ￿ X and consider the nonempty valued
dichotomic choice function cG
+ : P(X) ! P(X) as de￿ned by the ￿ lax￿satis￿cing
rule cG
+(A) = A \ G for any A ￿ X if A \ G 6= ?, and c(A) = A otherwise.
Now, posit ￿ = G ￿ (X n G) i.e. x￿y i⁄ x 2 G and y 2 X n G. It is easily
checked that for any Y ￿ X, cG
+ (Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) (which is also
externally stable).
The main objective of this article is precisely to provide a characterization
of all revealed cores in CX.
To begin with, let us consider two requirements concerning local existence
of nonempty solution sets.
No-dummy property (ND): c(fxg) = fxg for any x 2 X:
2- Properness (2-PR): c(A) 6= ? for any A ￿ X such that #A = 2:
It is easily checked that ND is satis￿ed by all revealed cores, while 2-PR is
only violated by core solutions when the underlying dominance digraph is not
asymmetric. A stronger property that obviously entails both ND and 2-PR is
Properness (PR): c(A) 6= ? for any nonempty A ￿ X:
3The following properties of a choice function c 2 CX play a prominent role,
under various labels, in the extant literature:
Cherno⁄ Contraction-consistency (C): for any A;B ￿ X such that A ￿ B ,
c(B) \ A ￿ c(A):
Concordance (CO): for any A;B ￿ X, c(A) \ c(B) ￿ c(A [ B):
Superset consistency (SS): for any A;B ￿ X , if A ￿ B and ? 6= c(B) ￿ c(A)
then c(A) ￿ c(B).
Property C is a contraction-consistency condition for choice sets in that it
requires that any outcome chosen out of a certain set should also be chosen out
of any subset of the former: essentially, it says that any good reason to choose a
certain option out of a given menu should retain its strenght in every submenu
of the former containing that option. An alternative, equivalent interpretation
of CO is as follows: if there exists a ￿ fuzzy￿classi￿cation of options of a given
menu in two subclasses with one option belonging to both that is not rejected in
either of the two corresponding submenus, then that option should not be rejected
in the comprehensive menu under consideration.
Conversely, property CO (also variously denoted as ￿ or Generalized Condorcet-
consistency) is an expansion-consistency condition for choice sets, requiring that
an outcome chosen out of a certain set and of a second one should also be chosen
out of the larger set given by the union of those two sets: it says any good reason
to choose a certain option out of two given menus should retain its strenght in
the larger menu obtained by merging those two menus.
Property SS is also an expansion-consistency requirement for choice sets: it
rules out the possibility that the choice set of a certain menu be nonempty and
strictly included in the choice sets of a smaller menu.
We are now ready to prove the main results of this paper. Let us start from
the following simple
Claim 5 Let R ￿ X￿X be any (binary) relation on X, and de￿ne ￿R ￿ X￿X




(ii) for any Y ￿ X, maxRY =
￿




Y = fx 2 Y : not yRx for all y 2 Xg;
(iii) R is re￿exive i⁄ ￿R is irre￿exive, and irre￿exive i⁄ ￿R is re￿exive;
(iv) R is total i⁄ ￿R is asymmetric, and asymmetric i⁄ ￿R is total;
(v) R is quasi-transitive i⁄ ￿R is quasi-transitive.
Proof. (i) For any x;y 2 X, by de￿nition xR￿
R
y i⁄ not y￿Rx i⁄ not (not
xRy) i⁄ xRy:
(ii) Let x 2 Y , and xRy for all y 2 Y : then, by de￿nition, not y￿Rx for all
y 2 Y , and conversely if not y￿Rx for all y 2 Y then not (not xRy) i.e. xRy
4for all y 2 Y . Similarly, x 2 Y and not yRx for all y 2 Y : then by de￿nition
x￿Ry for all y 2 Y .
(iii) Indeed, by de￿nition for any x 2 X, not x￿Rx i⁄ not( not xRx) i.e.
xRx. Similarly, not xRx i⁄ x￿Rx.
(iv) Suppose ￿R is asymmetric: then, for any x;y 2 X; it may be the case
that not y￿Rx or not x￿Ry (or both). Now, if not y￿Rx then xRy and if
not x￿Ry then yRx, therefore R is total. Conversely, suppose R is total. If
xRy then not( not xRy) hence not( y￿Rx) and similarly yRx entails not(
x￿Ry), thus in any case ￿R is asymmetric. Similarly, R is asymmetric i⁄ for
any x;y 2 X it cannot be the case that xRy and yRx, i.e. by de￿nition i⁄ it is
not the case that not y￿Rx and not x￿Ry, namely ￿R is total.
(v) Suppose that R is quasi-transitive, and that both x(￿R)ay and y(￿R)az.
Then, by de￿nition (not yRx and xRy), and ( not zRy and yRz ) i.e. xRay
and yRaz, hence xRaz. Therefore, xRz and not zRx i.e. not z￿Rx and x￿Rz,
namely x(￿R)az. Conversely, suppose that ￿R is quasi-transitive, and that
both xRay and yRaz. Then, by de￿nition (xRy and not yRx), and (yRz and
not zRy) i.e. by de￿nition (not y￿Rx and x￿Ry) and (not z￿Ry and y￿Rz),
i.e. x(￿R)ay and y(￿R)az, hence x(￿R)az. Therefore, x￿Rz and not z￿Rx
i.e. not zRx and xRz, namely xRaz.
Remark 6 The content of the previous Claim is certainly not unknown, but I
have been unable to ￿nd a reference in print except for the statement of point
(iv) in Monjardet (2007).
Theorem 7 (see also Wilson (1970), Sen(1971)) Let c 2 CX. Then, the fol-
lowing statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es ND, C and CO;
(ii) there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) for
any Y ￿ X;
(iii) there exists a re￿ exive relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY
for any Y ￿ X.
(iv) R(c) = Rc, R(c) is re￿exive and c(Y ) = maxR(c)Y for any Y ￿ X:
Proof. (i)=)(iv): Let c 2 CX. Now, for each Y ￿ X and x 2 c(Y ), xR(c)y
for any y 2 Y , by de￿nition of R(c). Hence c(Y ) ￿ maxR(c)Y . Now, let
c 2 CX also satisfy ND, C and CO, and x 2 maxR(c)Y . Then, by de￿nition,
for any y 2 Y there exists Yy such that y 2 Yy and x 2 c(Yy). It follows, by
C, that x 2 c(fx;yg) for any y 2 Y whence, by CO, x 2 c(Y ). Therefore,
c(Y ) = maxR(c)Y (clearly it may be the case that maxR(c)Y = ?). Notice
however that, by ND, x 2 c(fxg) i.e. xR(c)x for any x 2 X. Thus, R(c) is
re￿exive, as required.
(ii)()(iii) (see Wilson (1970), Theorem 3): Let c 2 CX . Thus, by Claim
5 (ii), for any Y ￿ X, if there exists R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY
for any Y ￿ X, then c(Y ) =
￿
x 2 Y : not y￿Rx for all y 2 X
￿
, for any Y ￿
5X. Moreover, if R is re￿ exive then by Claim 5(iii) ￿R is irre￿ exive hence
c(Y ) = C(Y;￿R
Y ). Conversely if there exists an irre￿ exive ￿ ￿ X ￿X such that
c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) for any Y ￿ X then by Claim 5 (ii)-(iii) c(Y ) = max￿R
Y for
any Y ￿ X, and ￿R is re￿ exive.
(iii)=)(iv): See Wilson (1970), Theorem 3. Moreover, observe that Rc ￿
R(c) by de￿nition, and xR(c)y implies x 2 maxR(c)fx;yg = c(fx;yg) i.e. xRcy
hence Rc = R(c) (of course, this is an extension to arbitrary choice functions of
the proof of the same result for proper choice functions due to Sen (1971)).
(iv)=)(iii): Trivial.
(iii)=)(i): Suppose that there exists a re￿exive relation R ￿ X ￿ X such
that c(Y ) = maxRY for any Y ￿ X. Clearly, by re￿ exivity of R, c(fxg) =
maxRfxg = fxg, hence c satis￿es ND. Moreover, for any Y ￿ Z ￿ X and any
x 2 c(Z) = maxR￿
Z, it must also be the case that x 2 maxR￿
Y = c(Y ) hence
C is also satis￿ed by c. Finally, for any Y;Z ￿ X and x 2 X, if x 2 c(Y ) =
maxR￿
Y and c(Z) = maxR￿
Z then clearly x 2 maxR￿
Y [Z whence x 2 c(Y [ Z)
and CO is satis￿ed as well.
Remark 8 Notice that the equivalence between statements (ii) and (iii) of The-
orem 7 above should in fact be credited to Wilson(1970) because it is strictly
related (indeed, essentially equivalent) to Theorem 3 of Wilson (1970), though
the latter concerns nonempty core-solutions over an arbitrary domain D ￿
P(X) r f?g hence, strictly speaking, is a statement about a class of partial
proper choice functions.
Remark 9 The foregoing characterization result is tight. To check that, con-
sider the following examples.
(1) Let cI 2 CX be de￿ned as follows: for any A ￿ X, cI(A) = maxLA if
A 6= fx￿g, and cI(fx￿g) = ? where L is a linear order on X and x￿is its bottom
element. Clearly, cI violates ND, but satis￿es C and CO;
(2) Let X = fx;y;zg, and cII 2 CX be de￿ned as follows: cII(fhg) = fhg
for any h 2 X, cII(fx;yg) = fxg, cII(fy;zg) = fyg, cII(fx;zg) = fzg, and
cII(X) = X. It is immediately checked that cIII satis￿es ND and CO, but
violates C since e.g. y 2 cII(X) \ fx;yg but y = 2 cII(fx;yg);
(3) Let cIII 2 CX be de￿ned as follows: for any A ￿ X, cIII(A) = maxLA
if #A ￿ 2 and cIII(A) = ? otherwise, where L is a linear order on X. It is
easily seen that cIII satis￿es ND and C, but violates CO.
Theorem 10 Let c 2 CX. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es ND, 2-PR, C and CO;
(ii) there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) for
any Y ￿ X;
(iii) there exists a total relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY for
any Y ￿ X;
(iv) R(c) = Rc, R(c) is total and c(Y ) = maxR(c)Y for any Y ￿ X:
6Proof. (i)=)(iii): Let c 2 CX satisfy ND, 2-PR, C, and CO. Then, by ND, C
and CO (and in view of Theorem 7 above) there exists a re￿ exive relation R on
X such that c(Y ) = maxRY = fy 2 Y : yRz for all z 2 Y g for each Y ￿ X .
Thus, by 2-PR, R is total.
(ii)()(iii): Suppose that there exists a total relation R ￿ X ￿ X such
that c(Y ) = maxRY for any Y ￿ X. Then, as recorded by Claim 5(ii) c(Y ) = ￿
x 2 Y : not y￿Rx for all y 2 X
￿
for any Y ￿ X. By Claim 5 (iv) ￿R is asym-
metric since R is total, hence in particular c(Y ) = C(Y;￿R
Y ) = Ca(Y;￿R
Y )
for any Y ￿ X. Conversely, suppose that there exists a dominance digraph
(X;￿) such that c(Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) = fx 2 Y : not y￿ax for all y 2 Xg, for
any Y ￿ X. Then, as recorded by Claim 5 (ii) c(Y ) = max(￿a)R
Y : by Claim 5
(iv), (￿a)R is total since ￿a is asymmetric.
(ii)=)(i): Suppose that there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that
c(Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) for any Y ￿ X. For any x 2 X, not x￿fxgx i.e not
x￿x by irre￿ exivity of ￿ whence by de￿nition c(fxg) = Ca(fxg;￿fxg) =
C(fxg;￿fxg) = fxg and ND is therefore satis￿ed by c. Furthermore, for any
x;y 2 X, ￿fx;yg ￿ f(x;y);(y;x)g hence ￿a
fx;yg 2 f?;f(x;y)g;f(y;x)gg. If
￿a
fx;yg = ? then Ca(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = fx;yg, otherwise Ca(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) =
fxg or Ca(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = fyg, respectively, hence in any case
c(fx;yg) = Ca(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) 6= ? thus c satis￿es 2-PR.
Also, for any Y;Z ￿ X such that Y ￿ Z, and any x 2 c(Z)\Y = Ca(Z;￿Z)\
Y , it must be the case that not z￿a
Zx for all z 2 Z hence in particular not z￿a
Y x
for all z 2 Y , i.e. x 2 Ca(Y;￿Y ) = c(Y ) and c also satis￿es C.
Moreover, let Y;Z ￿ X and x 2 c(Y ) \ c(Z) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) \ Ca(Z;￿Z).
Then, by de￿nition, not y￿a
Y x for all y 2 Y and not z￿a
Y x for all z 2 Z hence
not u￿a
Y x for all u 2 Y [ Z i.e. x 2 Ca(Y [ Z;￿Y [Z) = c(Y [ Z) and CO is
satis￿ed by c.
(iii)()(iv): See the proof of Theorem 7 above.
Remark 11 The foregoing characterization result is also tight. To see this,
consider the following examples.
(1) Let cI 2 CX as de￿ned above (see Remark 9). Clearly, cI violates ND,
but satis￿es 2-PR, C and CO;
(2) Let cII
￿
2 CX be de￿ned as follows: cII
￿
(fxg) = fxg for any x 2 X,
and cII
￿
(A) = ? for any A ￿ X such that #A ￿ 2. It is easily checked that
cII
￿
does indeed satisfy ND, C and CO, but clearly violates 2-PR;
(3) Let X = fx;y;zg, and cII 2 CX as de￿ned above (see Remark 9). It is
immediately checked that cII satis￿es ND, 2-PR, and CO, but violates C;
(4) Let cIII 2 CX as de￿ned above (see Remark 9). It is easily seen that
cIII satis￿es ND, 2-PR and C, but violates CO.
Corollary 12 (see also Sen (1971), Suzumura (1983)) Let c 2 C
￿
X. Then, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es C and CO;
7(ii) there exists a strictly acyclic dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) =
C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) for any Y ￿ X;
(iii) there exists a total relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY for
any Y ￿ X;
(iv) there exists a relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY for any
Y ￿ X.
(v) R(c) = Rc, R(c) is total, and c(Y ) = maxR(c)Y for any Y ￿ X:
Proof. (i)=)(ii): Since c 2 C
￿
X, c is proper hence in particular it also satis￿es
ND and 2-PR. Therefore, by Theorem 8 (ii) above, there exists a dominance
digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) for any Y ￿ X. Moreover, since
by hypothesis c is proper, Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any Y ￿ X hence (X;￿) must
be acyclic. In particular, Ca(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) 6= ? for any x;y 2 X, therefore ￿
is asymmetric as well. Thus, (X;￿) is indeed strictly acyclic and C(Y;￿Y ) =
Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any Y ￿ X.
(ii)=)(i): See the proof of Theorem 7 above;
(i)()(iii): Obvious, by Theorem 10 above, since, again, c 2 C
￿
X entails that
c satis￿es ND and 2-PR.
(iii)()(iv): Suppose there exists R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY for
any Y ￿ X. Since c 2 C
￿
X, c(Y ) 6= ? for any Y ￿ X. Hence, in particular, for
any x;y 2 X, c(fx;yg) 6= ?. It follows that R is total. The reverse implication
is trivial.
(iii)()(v): See the proof of Theorem 7 above, and of course Sen (1971).
Remark 13 Actually, it is well-known that a proper c satis￿es both C and CO
if and only if there exists a binary relation R on X such that c(Y ) = maxRY =
fy 2 Y : yRz for all z 2 Y g for each Y ￿ X and, moreover, R = R(c) = Rc
as de￿ned above -indeed, R(c) = Rc for any choice function that satis￿es C
(see e.g. Sen (1971), Suzumura (1983)). Thus, Corollary 12 is -essentially- a
restatement of the Sen-Suzumura characterization of revealed ￿ rational￿(proper)
choice functions or, equivalently, revealed non-empty core solutions.
Let us now turn to characterizations of revealed externally stable core-solutions.
Since externally stable cores (of nonempty sets) are nonempty the corresponding
choice functions are proper: thus, given the traditional focus on proper choice
functions, this subclass of revealed cores is the most widely studied, and best
known. In fact, for the sake of convenience, we collect the main - and partly
well-known- characterizations of revealed externally stable cores in the following
Theorem 14 (see also Suzumura (1983)) Let c 2 CX. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es PR, C, CO and SS;
(ii) there exists a quasi-transitive relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) =
maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X;
8(iii) there exists a total and quasi-transitive relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that
c(Y ) = maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X;
(iv) R(c) = Rc, R(c) is total and quasi-transitive, and c(Y ) = maxR(c)Y 6=
? for any Y ￿ X:
(v) there exists a re￿ exive and negatively transitive relation R ￿ X ￿ X
such that c(Y ) = maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X;
(vi) there exists a negatively transitive relation R ￿ X￿X such that c(Y ) =
maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X;
(vii) there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) =
Ca(Y;￿Y ) with C(Y;￿Y ) externally stable, for any Y ￿ X;
(viii) there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that ￿ is transitive and
c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X;
(ix) there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that ￿ is a strict partial
order and c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X.
Proof. (i)=)(ii) (Suzumura (1983)): By Theorem 2.6 of Suzumura (1983), if
c satis￿es PR, C, CO and SS then there exists a (re￿exive and) quasi-transitive
relation R ￿ X ￿ X such that c(Y ) = maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X.
But of course PR entails that c(fx;yg) = maxRfx;yg 6= ? for any x;y 2 X,
hence R is total as well.
(ii)=)(i) (Suzumura (1983)): See again Suzumura (1983), Theorems 2.5,
2.6 and 2.7.
(ii)()(iii): Let be R ￿ X ￿ X quasi-transitive and such that c(Y ) =
maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X. Of course, PR entails that in particular
c(fx;yg) = maxRfx;yg 6= ? for any x;y 2 X, hence R is total as well. The
reverse implication is trivial.
(iii)()(iv): See the proof of Theorem 7 above.
(iii)()(v): Let R ￿ X ￿ X be total and quasi-transitive, and x;y;z 2
X such that not xRy and not yRz. Hence, yRx and zRy since R is total.
Therefore, by de￿nition, yRax and zRay. By quasi-transitivity, it follows that
zRax, whence in particular not xRz i.e. R is negatively transitive. Moreover,
totality implies re￿ exivity of R. Conversely, let R ￿ X ￿ X be re￿ exive and
negatively transitive. Suppose there exist x;y 2 X such that not xRy and not
yRx: then, by negative transitivity, not xRx, a contradiction since R is re￿ exive.
Thus, R is also total. Moreover, let xRay and yRaz. Then, in particular, not
yRx and not zRy. It follows that, by negative transitivity, not zRx whence, by
totality, xRz. Thus, xRaz i.e. R is quasi-transitive as well.
(v)()(vi): Let R ￿ X ￿ X be a negatively transitive relation such that
c(Y ) = maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X. Then in particular, c(fxg) =
maxRfxg 6= ? for any x 2 X, hence R is re￿ exive as well. The reverse implica-
tion is trivial.
(iii)=)(vii): Let be R ￿ X￿X total, quasi-transitive and such that c(Y ) =
maxRY 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X. Clearly, by construction, c(Y ) =
fx 2 Y : xRy for all y 2 Y g i.e. c(Y ) =
￿




Y ) for any Y ￿ X (see Claim 5 (i) above). Moreover, by Claim 5 (iii),
￿R is asymmetric since R is total, hence C(Y;￿R
Y ) = Ca(Y;￿R
Y ). Now, take
9any y1 2 Y rC(Y;￿R
Y ). By de￿nition, there exists y2 2 Y such that y2￿R
Y y1.
If y2 2 C(Y;￿Y ) we are done. Suppose then that y2 2 Y rC(Y;￿R
Y ) as well:
thus, there exists y3 2 Y such that y3￿R
Y y2. It follows, by ￿niteness of Y and
nonemptiness of C(Y;￿R
Y ), that there exists a ￿nite k such that yi￿R
Y yi￿1 for
any i = 2;:::;k, and yk 2 C(Y;￿R
Y ). Since ￿R is asymmetric, it also follows
that yk￿R
Y y1, hence C(Y;￿R
Y ) is externally stable.
(vii)=)(i): Suppose that there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that
c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) with C(Y;￿Y ) externally stable, for any Y ￿ X.
By de￿nition of external stability, c(Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X, hence
c satis￿es PR. Moreover, by Theorem 6 (ii) above (or, for that matter, by
Theorem 8 (ii)), it also satis￿es C and CO. Finally, consider Y ￿ Z ￿ X
such that c(Z) ￿ c(Y ), and suppose there exists y 2 c(Y ) r c(Z) i.e. y 2
C(Y;￿Y )rC(Z;￿Z). Then, by external stability of C(Z;￿Z), there exists z 2
C(Z;￿Z) ￿ C(Y;￿Y ) ￿ Y such that z￿y, a contradiction since y 2 C(Y;￿Y ).
Therefore, c satis￿es SS as well.
(viii)()(iii): Suppose that there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such
that ￿ is transitive (hence in particular quasi-transitive) and c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) =
Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X. Then, by Claim 5 (i)-(ii) above,
? 6= c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = C(Y;￿R
￿
Y ) = maxR￿
Y for any nonempty Y ￿ X.
Moreover, by Claim 5 (v), R￿is quasi-transitive. Also, notice that since by
hypothesis ￿ is both irre￿ exive and transitive, it must be asymmetric as well.
Therefore, by Claim 5 (iv), R￿ is total. Conversely, suppose that there exists a
total and quasi-transitive relation R ￿ X￿X such that c(Y ) = maxRY 6= ? for
any nonempty Y ￿ X. Then, by Claim 5 (ii) c(Y ) = maxRY = Cu(Y;￿R
Y ) 6= ?
for any nonempty Y ￿ X. Moreover, by Claim 5 (iii),(v), and in view of quasi-
transitivity and totality of R, ￿R is both quasi-transitive and asymmetric, hence
transitive as well, and such that Cu(Y;￿R
Y ) = Ca
u(Y;￿R
Y ) as required.
(viii)()(ix): Suppose that there exists a dominance digraph (X;￿) such
that ￿ is transitive and c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y ) = Ca(Y;￿Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty
Y ￿ X. Again, irre￿ exivity and transitivity imply asymmetry of ￿, which is
therefore a strict partial order. The reverse implication is trivial.
Remark 15 Observe that the characterization result of revealed externally sta-
ble cores in terms of properties of choice functions included in Theorem 14 is
also tight. To see this, consider the following examples.
(1) Let cI 2 CX as de￿ned above (see Remark 9). Clearly, cI violates
PR,but satis￿es C, CO and SS;
(2) Let X = fx;y;zg, and cII 2 CX as de￿ned above (see Remark 9). It is
immediately checked that cII satis￿es PR,CO and SS, but violates C;
(3) Let X = fx;y;zg, and cIV 2 CX such that cIV (fug) = fug for any
u 2 X, cIV (fx;yg) = fx;yg, cIV (fy;zg) = fy;zg, cIV (fx;zg) = fx;zg and
cIV (fx;y;zg) = fx;yg. Clearly, cIV satis￿es PR, C and SS. However, cIV fails
to satisfy CO since z 2 (cIV (fx;zg)\ cIV (fy;zg)) r cIV (fx;y;zg);
(4) Let X = fx;y;zg, and cV 2 CX such that cV (fug) = fug for any u 2 X,
cV (fx;yg) = fxg, cV (fy;zg) = fyg, cV (fx;zg) = fx;zg and cV (fx;y;zg) =
10fxg. Clearly, cV satis￿es PR, C and CO but fails to satisfy SS since ? 6=
cV (fx;y;zg) ￿ cV (fx;zg) .
Remark 16 Notice that Theorem 14 above is a re￿nement of well-known re-
sults due to Suzumura (see e.g. Suzumura (1983), Theorems 2.8 and 2.10). It
should also be mentioned here that the conjunction of C and SS turns out to be
equivalent (see e.g. Suzumura (1983)) to another well-known and widely used
property, namely
Path Independence (PI): for any A;B ￿ X, c(A [ B) = c(c(A) [ c(B))
Thus, the equivalent statements of Theorem 14 are also equivalent to the
statement ￿ c 2 CX satis￿es PR, PI and CO￿ .
It should be remarked that the characterizations provided above are in gen-
eral quite straightforward extensions to arbitrary choice functions of previously
known results concerning proper choice functions. Indeed, the gist of the results
o⁄ered in the present section may be summarized as follows:
(i) remarkably, the characterizations of general revealed cores and a-cores
considered here consist of the very same properties used to characterize their
nonempty-valued counterparts as supplemented with very mild-looking local
nonemptiness requirements for choice sets of singleton and two-valued subsets,
respectively;
(ii) the exact correspondence between revealed core-solutions and maximiz-
ing ￿ rational￿choice functions is fully con￿rmed to hold within the general space
of arbitrary choice functions: the alleged extra-generality of the latter subclass
that has sometimes been alluded to in the literature (as e.g. in Suzumura (1983),
p.21) is de￿nitely con￿ned to the even wider realm of partial choice functions.
(iii) Finally, and most notably, the class of general revealed cores turns out
to inherit some of the supplementary order-theoretic structure enjoyed by its
larger ambient space as compared to the smaller and less regular space of proper
choice functions: that is precisely the topic of the next section.
3 Posets and semilattices of revealed cores
Let us now turn to a global description of the order-theoretic structure of
the class of all revealed core-solutions (a-core-solutions, nonempty-valued core-
solutions, externally stable core-solutions, respectively).
A partially ordered set or poset is a pair P = (P;6) where P is a set and
6 is a re￿ exive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on P (i.e. for any
x 2 P, x 6 x and for any x;y;z 2 P, x 6 z whenever x 6 y and y 6 z, and
x = y whenever x 6 y and y 6 z). A coatom of a poset P = (P;6) with a top
element or maximum 1P is any j 2 P which is covered by 1P- written j l 1P-
i.e. j < 1P and l = j for any l 2 P such that j 6 l < 1P. The set of all coatoms
of P is denoted A￿
P. Dually, an atom of P is any j 2 P which is an upper cover
11of 0P- written 0P lj- i.e. 0P < j and l = j for any l 2 P such that 0P < l 6 j.
The set of all atoms of P is denoted AP.
A poset P = (P;6) is a meet semilattice (join semilattice, respectively) if
for any x;y 2 P the 6-greatest lower bound x ^ y (the 6-least upper bound
x _ y, respectively) of fx;yg does exist. Moreover, P is a lattice if it is both
a meet semilattice and a join semilattice. A meet irreducible element of P is
any j 2 P such that j 6= _P and for any a;b 2 L if j = a ^ b then j 2 fa;bg.
The set of all meet irreducible elements of P is denoted MP. Similarly, A join
irreducible element of P is any j 2 P such that j 6= ^P and for any a;b 2 P
if j = a _ b then j 2 fa;bg. The set of all join irreducible elements of P is
denoted JP. It is easily checked that in general AP ￿ JP (A￿
P ￿ MP) while the
converse may not hold. P is atomistic i⁄ AP = JP i.e. equivalently whenever
each element a 2 P is the least upper bound of a set of atoms, and coatomistic
i⁄A￿
P = MP i.e. equivalently whenever each element a 2 P is the greatest lower
bound of a set of atoms.
A lattice P = (P;6) is bounded if there exist both a bottom element 0P and a
top element 1P (hence in particular a ￿nite lattice is also bounded), distributive
i⁄x^(y_z) = (x^y)_(x^z) for any x;y;z 2 P, complemented if it is bounded
and for any x 2 P there exists x0 2 P such that x _ x0 = 1P and x ^ x0 = 0P,
and Boolean i⁄ it is both distributive and complemented.
The set CX of all choice functions on X can be endowed in a natural way with
the point-wise set inclusion partial order 6 by positing, for any c;c0 2 CX, c 6 c0
i⁄ c(A) ￿ c0(A) for each A ￿ X. Clearly, the identity operator cid is its top
element, and the constant empty-valued choice function c? its bottom element.
It is well-known, and easily checked, that (CX;6) is in fact a Boolean lattice with
join _ = [ (i.e. set-union) and meet ^ = \ (i.e. set-intersection), both de￿ned in
the obvious component-wise manner: see e.g. Monjardet, Raderanirina (2004).
For any x;y 2 X such that x 6= y, c+
xy 2 CX and c￿
xy 2 CX are de￿ned
as follows: for all A ￿ X, c+
xy(A) = A r fyg if fx;yg ￿ A, and c+
xy(A) = A
otherwise, c￿
xy(fx;yg) = fyg, c￿
xy(fxg) = fxg, and c￿
xy(A) = ? for all A ￿ X
such that A 6= fx;yg and #A 6= 1. Moreover, C+ =
￿
c+






xy : x;y 2 X;x 6= y
￿
.
The minimum ND choice function c[1] is de￿ned by the following rule: for
any x 2 X; c[1](fxg) = fxg, and c[1](Y ) = ? for any Y ￿ X such that #Y 6= 1.
Now, let C￿









of all revealed nonempty-valued core-solutions, and C￿es
X the set of all revealed
externally stable core-solutions on X, respectively). We also denote with a slight




X ;6) and (C￿es
X ;6) the corresponding









X ) and 6=6 \(C￿es
X ￿ C￿es
X ), respectively). We have the following
Theorem 17 The poset (C￿
X;6) of revealed core-solutions is a sub-meet-semilattice
of (CX;6) with cid itself as its top element, but not a sub-join-semilattice of
(CX;6). The bottom element of (C￿
X;6) is the minimum ND choice function
12c[1]. Moreover, the set of coatoms of (C￿
X;6) is C+, and the set of its atoms is
C￿ .
Proof. Let c;c0 2 C￿
X, and consider c\c0. Clearly, for any x 2 X, (c\c0)(fxg) =
c(fxg) \ c0(fxg) = fxg since c and c0 satisfy ND: hence c \ c0 does also satisfy
ND.
Moreover, for any A ￿ B ￿ X, since c and c0 both satisfy C, (c\c0)(B)\A =
(c(B) \ c0(B)) \ A = c(B) \ (c0(B)) \ A) ￿ c(B) \ c0(A) ￿ c(B) \ A ￿ A hence
c \ c0 satis￿es C.
Finally, since c and c0 satisfy CO, for any A;B ￿ X,
(c \ c0)(A) \ (c \ c0)(B) =
(c(A) \ c(B)) \ (c0(A) \ c0(B)) ￿ c(A [ B) \ c0(A [ B) = (c \ c0)(A [ B)
and CO also holds for c \ c0. It follows that, by Theorem 7 above, c \ c0 2 C￿
X,
whence (C￿
X;6) is a sub-meet-semilattice of (CX;6).
It is easily checked that cid, the top element of (CX;6), does also satisfy
ND, C and CO hence as observed above c 2 C￿
X (see Example 2).
Now, consider c[1] as de￿ned above: it satis￿es ND, by de￿nition, and, being
nonempty-valued precisely on singletons, it trivially satis￿es C and CO as well.
Thus, c[1] 2 C￿
X. On the other hand, for any c 2 C￿
X, c must satisfy ND, hence
c[1] 6 c.
Next, take any c+
xy 2 C+. Notice that, by de￿nition, c+
xy satis￿es ND. Also,
if A ￿ B ￿ X then the following cases may be distinguished: (a) fx;yg ￿ A;
(b) fx;yg * A and fx;yg ￿ B; (c) fx;yg * B. If fx;yg ￿ A then c+
xy(B)\A =
Arfyg = c+
xy(A); if fx;yg * A and fx;yg ￿ B then c+
xy(B)\A = (Brfyg)\A =
A r fyg ￿ A = c+
xy(A); if fx;yg * B then c+
xy(B) \ A = A = c+
xy(A): thus in
any case C holds. Furthermore, let z = 2 c+
xy(A [ B): then by de￿nition z = y
and fx;yg ￿ A [ B. Assume now that y 2 c+
xy(A) \ c+
xy(B). Then, fx;yg * A
and fx;yg * B while y 2 A \ B. It follows that x = 2 A [ B, a contradiction.
Thus, CO is also satis￿ed by c+
xy, Theorem 7 applies, and c+
xy 2 C￿
X.
Moreover, by de￿nition c+
xy < cid i.e. c+
xy 6 cid and c+
xy 6= cid. Let c 2 C￿
X
be such that c+
xy 6 c 6 cid, and assume that there exist A;B ￿ X with fx;yg ￿
A\B, c(A) = Arfyg and c(B) = B. Then, by Theorem 7, c satis￿es ND, C and
CO: hence in particular, by C, fx;yg = c(B)\fx;yg ￿ c(fx;yg) i.e. c(fx;yg) =
fx;yg 6= c(A), and therefore fx;yg ￿ A. But then, take any z 2 Arfx;yg, and
consider Arfxg and Arfzg. Clearly, c(Arfxg) ￿ c+
xy(Arfxg) = Arfxg and
c(Arfzg) ￿ c+
xy(Arfzg) = Arfzg, hence y 2 c(Arfxg) and y 2 c(Arfzg).
However, y = 2 c(A) = c((Arfxg)[(Arfzg)), which contradicts CO. It follows
that either c = cid or c = c+
xy i.e. c+
xy is indeed a coatom of (C￿
X;6).
Conversely, let c be a coatom of (C￿
X;6) and suppose c = 2 C+. Then, for
any pair of distinct x;y 2 X, neither c+
xy 6 c nor c 6 c+
xy i.e. there exist
A;B ￿ X such that c(A) ￿ c+
xy(A) and c+
xy(B) ￿ c(B). Thus, by de￿nition,
c+
xy(B) = B r fyg and c(B) = B ￿ fx;yg, while there exists z 2 A such that
z 2 c+
xy(A)rc(A). Hence, consider any x 2 Arfzg: then, there exists B0 such
that fx;zg ￿ B0 ￿ X and c(B0) = B0. By C, fx;zg = c(B0)\fx;zg ￿ c(fx;zg)
i.e. c(fx;zg) = fx;zg ￿ A for any x 2 A while z = 2 c(A), which contradicts CO
in view of ￿niteness of X.
13To check that each c￿
xy 2 C￿ is an atom of (C￿
X;6), just observe that
c￿
xy(A) = c[1](A) for any A 6= fx;yg, and c￿
xy(fx;yg) = fxg while c[1](fx;yg) =
?. Thus, for any c 2 C￿
X (indeed, for any c 2 CX) if c[1] 6 c 6 c￿
xy then either
c = c[1] or c = c￿
xy. Conversely, assume that c is an atom of (C￿
X;6) and c = 2 C￿.
Then, by de￿nition of C￿, c(A) = ? for any A such that #A = 2, and there
exists B ￿ X such that #B ￿ 3 and c(B) 6= ?. It follows that, for any x 2 c(B)
and any y 2 B r fxg, c(B) \ fx;yg * ? = c(fx;yg), therefore violating C, a
contradiction by Theorem 7.
To check that (C￿
X;6) is not a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6), just consider
without loss of generality X = fx;y;zg,
R = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z);(y;x);(y;z);(x;z)g and
R￿1 = f(x;x);(y;y);(z;z);(x;y);(z;y);(z;x)g.
Now, posit cI(A) = C(A;￿R
A) and cII(A) = C(X;￿R
￿1
A ) for any A ￿ X.
By de￿nition C(X;￿R) = fyg, C(fx;zg;￿R





fx;yg) = fxg hence (cI [ cII)(X) = fy;zg, while x 2 (cI [
cII)(fx;yg)\ (cI [ cII)(fx;zg), which contradicts CO.
Remark 18 Notice that ￿niteness of X has been used in the proof above in
order to show that the set of coatoms of (C￿
X;6) is contained in C+. The latter
statement clearly holds for an in￿nite X as well provided CO is replaced with
the following stronger version of ￿ Concordance￿







Remark 19 Since (C￿
X;6) is a semilattice with a top element (and indeed a
￿nite one, under ￿niteness of X), it follows that it is also a lattice with meet=
\ and join of a pair given by the meet of the (nonempty) set of upper bounds of
that pair (see e.g. Davey, Priestley (1990)), which is however not a sublattice
of (CX;6).
Thus, the poset of revealed core-solutions enjoys a remarkably regular struc-
ture. The posets of revealed a-core-solutions, nonempty-valued core-solutions,
and externally stable core-solutions are considerably less regular, as recorded
by the following results, namely
Theorem 20 The poset (C￿a
X ;6) of revealed a-core-solutions has a top element,
cid, and C+ is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-meet-semilattice
nor a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6). The minimal elements of (C￿a
X ;6) are
the choice functions c 2 CX that satisfy ND, 2-PR, C, CO and such that (a)
#c(A) ￿ 1 for any A ￿ X and (b) not Dc0 ￿ Dc for any c0 that satis￿es ND,
2-PR, C and CO.
Proof. To check that cid is indeed the top element of (C￿a
X ;6) it is only to be
observed -in view of Theorem 7- that cid does in fact also satisfy 2-PR. Similarly
-in view of Theorem 7 and of the proof of Theorem 17 provided above- to see
14that C+ is the set of coatoms of (C￿a
X ;6) it is only to be checked that any
c+
xy 2 C+ does also satisfy 2-PR (which is clearly the case, by de￿nition).
The proof of Theorem 17 already establishes that (C￿a
X ;6) is not a sub-join-
semilattice of (CX;6) since, as it is easily checked, cI and cII as de￿ned there
do belong to C￿a
X .
Next, consider cIII and cIV de￿ned as follows: assume without loss of gener-
ality X = fx;y;zg, and take ￿III = f(x;y);(x;z);(y;z)g, ￿IV = f(x;y);(x;z);(z;y)g
(notice that both (X;￿III) and (X;￿IV ) are asymmetric digraphs); then, for
any A ￿ X, posit cIII(A) = C(A;￿III
A ) and cIV (A) = C(A;￿IV










Therefore, cIII \ cIV violates 2-PR hence by Theorem 7 cIII \ cIV = 2 C￿a
X .
It follows that (C￿a
X ;6) is not a sub-meet-semilattice of (CX;6).
The last statement about minimal elements of (C￿a
X ;6) is a straightforward
consequence of Theorem 10.
Theorem 21 The poset (C￿
￿
X ;6) of nonempty-valued core-solutions has a top
element, cid, and C+ is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-meet-
semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6). The minimal elements of
(C￿a
X ;6) are the single-valued choice functions that satisfy C and CO.
Proof. First, notice that by de￿nition cid is proper, hence cid 2 C￿
￿
X since as
previously shown it is a core-solution. Also, it is immediately checked that, by
de￿nition, any c+
xy is proper. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 17 also establishes
that C+ is the set of coatoms of (C￿
￿
X ;6). In the same vein, it is immediately
checked that cI;cII;cIII;cIV -as de￿ned above in the proofs of the two previous
Theorems- are also proper. It follows, by those proofs, that (C￿
￿
X ;6) is neither a
sub-meet-semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6). The ￿nal statement
about minimal elements of (C￿
￿
X ;6) is an immediate consequence of Corollary
12.
Theorem 22 The poset (C￿es
X ;6) of revealed externally stable core-solutions,
has a top element, cid, and C+ is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-
meet-semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6). The minimal elements
of (C￿a
X ;6) are the single-valued choice functions that satisfy C, CO and SS.
Proof. Observe that for any A ￿ B ￿ X, if cid(B) ￿ cid(A) then of course
B ￿ A i.e. B = A whence cid(A) = cid(B) and SS is clearly satis￿ed by cid. In
view of Theorem 14, this establishes that cid is also the top element of (C￿es
X ;6).
Also, it is immediately checked that any c+
xy satis￿es SS: indeed, let A;B ￿ X be
such that A ￿ B and ? 6= c+
xy(B) ￿ c+
xy(A) . Since A ￿ B, the following jointly
exhaustive cases are to be distinguished: (a) fx;yg ￿ A\B; (b) fx;yg * A[B;
(c) fx;yg ￿ B and fx;yg * A. Under (a), c+
xy(A) = A r fyg and c+
xy(B) =
B rfyg hence c+
xy(A) ￿ c+
xy(B). Under (b), c+
xy(A) = A and c+
xy(B) = B hence
again c+
xy(A) ￿ c+
xy(B). Under (c), c+
xy(A) = A and c+
xy(B) = B r fyg whence
15A 6= B i.e. A ￿ B. By hypothesis, c+
xy(B) ￿ c+
xy(A) hence B r fyg ￿ A ￿ B:
thus, y = 2 A and B = A [ fyg and therefore c+
xy(B) = B r fyg = A = c+
xy(A).
It follows that c+
xy does in fact satisfy SS. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 17
also establishes that C+ is the set of coatoms of (C￿es
X ;6).
Finally, it is immediately checked by direct inspection that cI;cII;cIII;cIV
-as de￿ned above in the proofs of Theorems 19 and 20- do also (trivially) satisfy
SS. It follows, by the very same proofs, that (C￿es
X ;6) is neither a sub-meet-
semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (CX;6). The ￿nal statement about
minimal elements of (C￿es
X ;6) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 14.
Thus, while only the poset of revealed core-solutions is a (meet) sub-semilattice
of (CX;6) all the posets of revealed cores de￿ned above share their top element
and set of coatoms.
4 Concluding remarks
Choice functions which may be regarded as core-solutions or externally stable
core solutions of an underlying dominance digraph (X;￿) have been character-
ized both in the general case and for asymmetric dominance digraphs. Both
characterizations combine restrictions on local nonemptiness and the usual mix
of contraction consistency and expansion consistency conditions for choice sets
which is required for proper i.e. nonempty-valued choice functions.
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